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Abstract 
The system of health care provision in Ireland came to a crossroads in the early 21
st century. 
Problems of capacity constraints reached a critical level during the years of rapid economic growth 
and population expansion of the 1990s and 2000s. Provision of both primary and acute health 
care was no longer adequate to the needs of a growing population whose expectations were also 
rising. Public spending on health care provision grew at unprecedented rates during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Policy documents published during the 1990s reiterated support for the public 
system, providing equitable access to and quality healthcare for all. Yet at the same time 
government was offering new incentives and supports to private sector initiatives in healthcare 
provision. Ireland appeared to be at a critical juncture in the governance of health care, between 
intensifying public provision on the one hand, and increasing its reliance on the private sector on 
the other. This paper explores the rationale for private insurance in parallel with public provision, 





In this chapter we examine some of the implications of this dual system, with particular reference 
to the acute hospital sector. First we outline the main features of the Irish system that 
differentiate it from other countries that have private as well as public health care. Second, we 
suggest that the insurance system developed in Ireland resulted in inequitable access to most 
consultant care and to hospital care for surgical procedures. Third, we consider how best to 
explain the evolution and persistence of the current system. We suggest that the nature of 
consultants’ contracts is intimately bound up with the continuity of the two-tier system. Finally, 
we argue that the uneasy dual-track policy in fact entailed an unacknowledged bias toward 
growing reliance on private health care and a reinforcement of established inequities. 
Perspectives on public and private health care 
Health care has become one of the most important areas of public policy in modern states. 
Citizens expect to have access to affordable treatment appropriate to their condition, and where 
this does not exist, this is generally viewed as a problem where policy intervention is appropriate. 
Many of the wealthier OECD countries combine a public and a private sector in acute health care, 
though the mechanisms for funding and delivery vary considerably. There is no optimal amount 
any country might spend on healthcare. As Barr notes, somewhat facetiously perhaps, ‘if we spent 
nothing on health, some people would die unnecessarily from trivial complaints; if we spent the 
whole national income on health care there would be no food and we would all die of starvation’ 
(Barr, 1998, p279.).  
Like education, healthcare is an example of a publicly provided private good, paid for to a large 
extent by the public purse, where the marginal cost of an additional another user is substantial, 
and once the resource has been used it cannot be used elsewhere. There are both efficiency and 
equity arguments for state intervention in the market for healthcare. Healthcare is associated with 
numerous market failures and government intervention is seen as necessary to correct these 
problems. But in addition, healthcare is an example of a merit good, which should be available to 
all regardless of ability to pay, so that access to essential medical attention is not debarred by 
reason of inadequate means. This, as with all equity-related decision-making by a society, is a 
normative judgment.  Redistribution from the better-off to the less well-off through a benefit-in-
kind (such a public healthcare) rather than a cash transfer, ensures that resources are spent for 
the purposes intended (Barr 1998).   2 
 
Nevertheless, some powerful arguments have been put forward in favour of private provision and 
financing in healthcare Chief among these is that it reduces the burden on the public sector and 
thereby improves both access to the public sector and the quality of the service it can offer 
(Besley and Coate 1991). Indeed, redistributive benefits can even be shown to occur, under 
certain conditions, where a private alternative exists. If the quality of the public sector is kept at a 
level that induces those who are better off to leave the public sector and seek private treatment, 
this will free up space in the public sector for those who remain (Besley and Coate 1991). Patients 
with low waiting costs will choose public treatment.  Waiting time induces patients with high 
waiting costs to choose private treatment, thereby reducing the cost of public health care that 
everyone pays for (Hoel and Saether 2003). So the existence of a private sector may free up 
resources, thereby helping to reduce waiting lists in the public sector; and it may offer choice by 
allowing those who are willing to pay to seek treatment elsewhere. But these assumptions only 
hold if public and private sectors are strictly alternative paths of treatment. And it depends on the 
public sector being seen as the default option, catering to the great majority, and resourced to a 
level that maintains broad-based satisfaction with the system. As we shall see, all of these 
assumptions turn out to be problematic in the Irish case.  
The nature and extent of the role of private funding varies greatly across the OECD, but in most 
western European countries, government plays a key role in healthcare provision, and free or 
subsidised health care is available to a significant majority of citizens. Health care at a certain 
quality level is provided and paid for through public funds, though the relative balance of tax and 
social insurance funding may vary. However despite the availability of this public health care, in 
most countries citizens also have the right to choose or alternate between varying combinations 
of public and private health care, if they wish to do so. The decision to purchase private care is 
often prompted by an individual’s desire to bypass perceived public sector inflexibilities and to 
access treatment with a quality level higher than that offered by the public system.  
Although Ireland spends rather less than the average amount on health care relative to GDP, 
Figure 1 below shows that total per capita spending on health was not unusually low compared 
with other OECD countries.
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1 Comparative data can be difficult to compare with confidence. Irish health spending appears 
lower than it really is because, unlike other countries, GDP was higher than GNP in Ireland during 
the 1990s and 2000s. And the Irish population had a lower rate of age dependency, which should 
keep demand lower than elsewhere. On the other hand, at least two of the seven categories of 3 
 
Figure 1. Health expenditure per capita, US$, public and private, 2007 
While the particular combination of public and private in the Irish health care system is distinctive, 
the existence of a private alternative, offering a quality level higher than that of the public sector, 
is not unique. Many wealthy countries have some role for private insurance. 
 Countries tend to cluster in their funding patterns. Figure 2 shows that not only the mix of public 
and private in total health spending varies, but that within the public sector, the contribution of 
public social insurance as opposed to spending from general government revenues can vary a lot 
too. Almost 80  per cent of total spending on healthcare provision in Ireland comes from public 
sources and, like Britain and Sweden, this is mostly funded through general taxation (A Nolan 
2008, p.302).  
Figure 2. Composition of total health expenditure, 2007 
Consistent with  Esping-Andersen’s well-known typology of welfare states, continental European 
countries are strongly insurance-based in their health funding, and Scandinavian countries fund 
their welfare spending from general revenues (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen, Gallie, 
Hemerijck and Myles 2002). The USA stands out in that, for a wealthy country, a much smaller 
proportion of total health spending is channelled through public provision.   
The Irish ‘duplicate’ system 
Delving further, the OECD classifies the Irish system as a ‘duplicate’ system, that is, one where 
insurance complements, supplements but also duplicates that offered by the public system. In 
duplicate systems, private health insurance typically provides a level of care, choice and speed of 
access above that offered by the public system (OECD 2004). Currently, along with Australia, 
Ireland has the largest duplicate market in the OECD. Approximately half the population in both 
countries holds private health insurance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Irish health spending are ‘social spending’ in OECD terms: community care of elderly, and disability 
supports. Nolan, Anna. 2008. Health: Funding, Access and Efficiency. In The Economy of Ireland: 
National and Sectoral Policy Issues, edited by John W. O'Hagan, and Carol Newman. Dublin: Gill 
and Macmillan. , Tussing, A. Dale, and Maev-Ann Wren. 2006. How Ireland Cares: The Case for 
Health Care Reform. Dublin: New Island Press.  
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The Irish system features universal entitlement to public care, but there are important limits to 
this in practice. Public out- and in-patient hospital services are heavily subsidized by the state for 
those who are not eligible for medical cards, hence justifying Ireland’s classification as a ‘universal’ 
system.  Charges in the public sector are subject to means-testing, and non-medical card holders 
can incur significant user fees as they access medical care. But the capacity of the health care 
system to provide access to appropriate medical care entails a strong reliance on private sector 
provision. The trends in eligibility for free public medical services on the one hand, and 
consumption of private health insurance on the other, throw up some explanatory puzzles. The 
proportion of the population with medical cards stood at about 38 per cent in 1977, and varied 
only a little until 1987. By 2001 though, it had fallen to 31 per cent (Wren 2003, p.375), and was 
below 30 per cent in April 2008 (Dáil Debates, Vol. 654, 15 May 2008, Deputy Mary Harney, 
Written Answer 19025/08). But entitlement to free hospital care, subject to a nightly charge, was 
extended to the whole population in 1991. Access to free GP care was broadened to all those aged 
over 70 (albeit concluded on controversial terms) in 2001, though rescinded in 2008 with a return 
of a means-test as a result of budgetary pressures associated with the economic downturn. And 
partial cover for primary care (covering GP visits only) was extended to more low-income families 
in 2005.  
Yet just as we see entitlement to both hospital and primary care expanding, the proportion of the 
population taking out private health insurance shows a marked increase. The proportion of the 
population with private health insurance was 18 per cent in 1977, a figure that rose to about 30 
per cent in 1982. This had further grown to 25 per cent in 1990, and continued to grow thereafter 
to 46 per cent in 2001 (Wren 2003, p.375); the 2009 figure was about 52 per cent (Burke 2009, 
p.15; Thomas, Normand and Smith 2006). The reasons for the expansion of private health 
insurance, in parallel with the extension of public sector cover, need to be explored further. 
The incentives to take out private health insurance can be traced to the long-standing government 
policy of facilitating arrangements for private healthcare as a means of augmenting the resources 
and capacity available for acute sector health care (Department of Health and Children 1999).   A 
central tenet of the argument supporting this policy is not just the cost-saving to the public system 
when patients seek treatment in the private sector, thereby forgoing their public entitlements and 
in theory, freeing up of resources in the public sector for those that remain. A further 
consideration is that patients opting for private treatment often receive their treatment in public 
hospitals. This means that their insurance pays the public hospital as well the consultants for their 
treatment: public hospitals have an incentive to treat private patients (Finn and Harmon 2006). 5 
 
Indeed, government policy actively supports insurance take-up as a means of boosting the 
hospitals’ resource base.  
Private insurance in Ireland is said to facilitate equitable treatment because the cost of insurance 
was governed from the outset by principles of community rating. Notwithstanding some qualifying 
conditions, and some recent complexities arising from the need to comply with EU competition 
requirements, private health insurance premiums were not weighted by individual characteristics 
such as age or health status of the policy-holder. The risk is thereby pooled across all policy 
holders, though because the scheme is voluntary, ‘risk-pooling’ does not have the society-wide 
reach of universal insurance schemes. The private health insurance system in Ireland was 
established in 1957, provided by a state-owned, non-profit, monopoly insurer, Voluntary Health 
Insurance (VHI). This was designed to cater for the top 15 per cent of earners who, at the time, 
were excluded from an entitlement to free or subsidised public health services. It was set up 
principally to provide cover for acute hospital care and typically covers all or most inpatient 
hospital expenses. Private outpatient hospital appointments are paid by the user on a pay-per-
visit basis, on the same basis as private GP services. Insurance schemes make a relatively low 
contribution to them.  
Private health insurance cover in Ireland therefore continued to be strongly associated with acute 
hospital inpatient care, and the bulk of the claims discharged involved costs associated with 
surgical procedures requiring hospital stay.  Direct subsidies such as tax relief on private health 
insurance premia are justified on the grounds that they ‘allow those with chronic health 
conditions to benefit from insurance at a reasonable cost’ (Department of Health and Children 
1999). 
From 1987 on, sharp cuts were made in healthcare spending as part of the drive to curb public 
spending and to reduce high levels of public indebtedness.  The investment deficits at this time 
resulted in lasting under-resourcing of the public sector in comparative terms, with a legacy of a 
lower ratio of beds to population, and lower numbers of specialist consultants in relation to 
population than other OECD countries. We must not assume any intention to roll back the welfare 
state, analogous to retrenchment policies then gathering momentum across continental Europe. 
Rather, a relatively under-developed healthcare system had suffered restrictions before a full 
high-quality public system had been put in place. Public spending on health care in fact 
subsequently increased under every combination of party in power. From 2000, spending on 
health care grew at unprecedented rates, much faster than other OECD countries. But spending 
per capita on most indicators still lagged behind EU rates (Tussing and Wren 2006, ch.1). The 6 
 
legacy of the cutbacks and of the restrictions on infrastructural investments throughout the 
difficult years of the 1980s persisted in the form of capacity constraints throughout the system. 
Rapidly increasing public spending translated into much slower improvement in service delivery.  
Problems of sustaining a public-private mix 
We have already noted the arguments in favour of public policy support for a private sector health 
alternative. But there are two problems with this argument. The first is that the existence of a 
strong private sector may have the opposite effect – that it may result in draining resources from 
the public sector, thereby reducing public sector quality and restricting access (Besley, Hall and 
Preston 1999; Iversen 1997). The second is that the targeting of benefits toward the least well off, 
to achieve the best results in alleviating need,  may actually be counter-productive if the primary 
aim is social equity, as it may intensify the flight into the private sector.  
Policy feedback and quality slippage 
If individuals are to forgo public sector entitlements and pay for private sector treatment, whether 
out of pocket or through insurance schemes, the public sector must be of a quality that is lower 
than the private alternative. From the point of view of equitable access to services, this may be 
problematic. The quality of the public sector may be ‘too’ low, resulting in significantly worse 
experiences for those depending on public provision.  
  Among the considerations that weigh upon governments in the allocation of public spending, 
electoral pressures are always likely to loom large.  Private health sector users may be able to 
exercise disproportionate influence over the allocation of resources in health care provision both 
directly through lobbying and voting behaviour, and indirectly by participating in or opting out of 
the public provisions on offer (Blomquist and Christiansen 1999). Once an individual is privately 
insured they cease to be concerned about public sector waiting lists, which is generally taken as an 
indicator for public sector quality (Besley, Hall and Preston 1998; Besley et al. 1999). If the 
intensity of demand for public services can be alleviated by siphoning it off to the private sector, 
the pressure on policy-makers to improve public sector quality – measured in terms of waiting-list 
length and duration – may be diminished. Moreover, private users may favour a smaller role for 
the state as a matter of principle (Propper and Burckhardt 1999). If attitudes are further affected 
by use, then an expansion of private healthcare may mean a further diminution in support for 
public provision and for the taxation required to fund it: ‘Government may under-fund public 
services in areas with high private insurance coverage’ (Siciliani and Hurst 2003). It may be that 
those who opt for private insurance are among the most affluent and articulate and are more 7 
 
successful at political lobbying than other groups. Since better public services and shorter waiting 
lists are not a priority for them, political pressure on these issues is reduced, and electoral and 
lobbying support for private sector alternatives is correspondingly strengthened. British research 
offers some support for these hypotheses. Besley and his co-authors, for example, suggest that  
regions in which many are privately insured appear to put fewer resources into keeping 
waiting lists short… From a public choice perspective, resource allocation is influenced by 
wilful political acts. If more individuals choose to opt out of certain NHS services by taking 
out private insurance this can affect the way in which resources are allocated (Besley et al. 
1998, p.496).  
In the British experience, investigators have found that patterns of use and the political 
articulation of policy preferences tend to go together: 
On the one hand, the private alternative reduces the demand on the public system, 
thereby reducing costs, to the benefit of users of the public system. On the other hand, 
the loss of clientele to the private sector can be expected to reduce public support for a 
high quality public service, at least among those who do not use the public alternative. 
This is particularly true if those with the highest demand for quality are the first to opt out 
of the public system’  (Epple and Romano 1995, p.298). 
These findings are not uncontested. Propper, for example, argues that many health service users 
in Britain tend to use both public and private in varying combinations, depending on 
circumstances and geographical location (Propper and Burckhardt 1999). Many services are in any 
case not normally available through the private sector – Accident and Emergency, most notably.  
It is possible that these patterns are not as readily investigable in the Irish case. In Britain, public 
and private health sectors constitute two distinct sectors with separate organizational structure. 
But even at that, it has been estimated that only about 1 per cent of total NHS admissions in 2001 
were through the private sector (National Economic and Social Forum 2002, p.38). In Ireland, in 
contrast, the interpenetration makes the distinction less stark and less immediately visible. But 
private insurance cover does offer the kind of choices which Besley, Propper and others have been 
concerned to investigate in the British case. So it is at least plausible that some comparability of 
findings might be anticipated in the Irish case.  8 
 
The paradoxes of targeting 
Targeting benefits and services through means testing is often held to be the best way to achieve 
redistribution and to ensure that those in need receive most help. However, taking the above 
arguments one step further, a number of analyses of the welfare state have pointed out that 
governments may be able to build up electoral coalitions of support behind a universal model of 
provision, not primarily by appealing to the altruism of the wealthiest, but by ensuring that every 
income-group sees benefits in the scheme for itself. Korpi and Palme argue that ‘institutional 
structures affect the ways in which citizens come to define their interests and preferences’ (Korpi 
and Palme 1998, p.664). Welfare state institutions are shaped by different interest groups. Once 
these institutions are in place, they tend to influence the way citizens perceive their interests and 
the kinds of political alliances that are most appealing to them. Welfare state institutions 
themselves therefore have feedback effects on distributive processes. Universal care is 
undoubtedly more expensive to provide than targeted care. But paradoxically, electoral support 
for higher taxation and higher spending is likely to be stronger where entitlements are universal, 
and where everyone therefore has some grounds for believing that they are ‘all in the one boat’ 
(Rothstein 1998).  
Although hospital care is in principle available to all in Ireland, the Irish health care system has 
many of the characteristics of a targeted system. The risk is, as Titmuss noted, that welfare for the 
poor is poor welfare (Titmuss 1958). As Levi notes, support from the middle class from a public 
sector is based on ‘contingent consent’, whereby government must offer benefits at level of 
quality level  that keeps voters broadly happy (Levi 1998, p.88). The rise in demand for private 
insurance suggests dissatisfaction with public provision in Ireland. But more seriously than that, 
survey evidence indicates much greater levels of dissatisfaction with health care provision in 
Ireland than in almost all other OECD countries. In a 2002 Eurobarometer survey reported in the 
OECD’s  Health Data Report for 2008, respondents in Finland, Belgium and France topped the poll 
in recording favourable verdicts on their national health care systems that were between two and 
three times greater than the negative ones. Only 20  per cent of Irish respondents reported 
judgments that were at all positive, and 72  per cent reported that their health care arrangements 
required ‘fundamental changes’ or needed to be ‘completely rebuilt’. This level of dissatisfaction 
was topped only by Greece’s 78  per cent and Portugal’s 80  per cent (SourceOECD 2008).  9 
 
Equity issues in a two-tier system  
The Irish dual system created two levels of health care according to insurance status and therefore 
ability to pay. For most procedures against which it is possible to insure, it is normal to find that 
separate waiting lists are maintained for public and private patients, resulting in variations in 
waiting time that depend on means rather than clinical need. This is one of the most visible 
aspects of inequitable treatment in the Irish healthcare system, and probably the issue that 
generates most resentment. Furthermore, instead of the public and private sectors each having 
their own funding stream, and contrary to the incentive systems facing hospitals to treat private 
patients in public hospitals, in fact the Irish acute care system is based on massive subsidies 
flowing from the public system to the private.   
The profile of those with private insurance 
We now turn to consider the socio-economic and household characteristics of those who buy 
private health insurance, and their motivations for doing so.  
In Ireland, about 52 per cent of the population in 2008 had private insurance, 27 per cent had free 
access on grounds of low income; about 25 per cent had neither medical cards nor private 
insurance. 70 per cent of those not qualifying for the free public care under the mean-tested 
medical card scheme opted for private health insurance (Finn and Harmon 2006). And some with 
medical card entitlements still took out private insurance, generally on account of a chronic or 
acute health condition (Burke 2009, p.15). But recent work examining the impact of individual and 
household characteristics on the probability of buying private insurance shows that the better 
educated, wealthier and healthier are much more likely to insure themselves. There is a clear 
disparity between those with and those without private health insurance across both income and 
education levels. Nearly 60 per cent of those in the top income quartile are insured compared to 
18 per cent of those in the lowest quartile. Of those people with no educational qualifications or 
who only attended primary education, only 20 per cent have health insurance. Among those with 
third-level education (which is a category that has expanded rapidly over the last 30 years, and 
accounts for up to half of those in the younger age categories), almost four-fifths (79 per cent) are 
privately insured. Those with a third-level education have a 43 per cent higher probability of 
having private health insurance compared with those with no qualifications or primary education 
only. Those with the strongest propensity to have private insurance are not those with the 
greatest incidence of current health needs. Only 26 per cent of those with poor health are 
privately insured. Of those with good health, almost double this proportion, 47 per cent, have 10 
 
private health insurance. The effect of poor health on propensity to insure is in fact negative – 
those with poor health status have a 10 per cent less probability of being insured than those with 
good health (Finn and Harmon 2006; Harmon and Nolan 2001) And we can also show that health 
status itself is inversely related to income and education (Finn and Harmon 2006). 
Irish public policy is aimed at promoting the take-up of private health insurance as a means of 
improving the supply and quality of healthcare. It does so through incentives such as community 
rating and tax reliefs. But it now seems that this is primarily successful at encouraging take-up 
among people at the higher ends of the income and education distributions, and those who 
already enjoy better health (Layte and Nolan 2004). 
A majority of people cite a concern with quality as the most important consideration in their 
decision to insure. Typically private health insurance buys an individual a higher standard of 
accommodation (private or semi-private) and hotel-style facilities (i.e. TV, phone, meal menus). 
But access clearly looms largest in people’s motivations for taking out private insurance. Chief 
among people’s concerns about public sector quality is not the standard of accommodation 
facilities once in hospital, but the ability to avoid queueing for outpatient appointments and for 
surgical procedures  (Harmon and Nolan 2001; Watson and Williams 1996).  
Evidence about differential access is hard to come by. No central record of waiting list statistics is 
kept anywhere in the Irish health system, and the National Patient Treatment Register (NTPF) only 
provides information on waiting times for public patients for procedures in public hospitals. 
Indeed the time spent between referral from a general practitioner and an initial consultant 
appointment in the public sector often considerably exceeds the time spent between being 
recommended for a surgical procedure and admission to hospital (Wren 2003). The National 
Economic and Social Forum (NESF) found that following referral for a procedure, about a quarter 
of those without insurance, but no-one with private insurance, waited for more than one year for 
hospital-based treatment. (National Economic and Social Forum 2002, pp. 55-59). Furthermore, 
‘going private’, whether through out-of-pocket payments or using private health insurance, also 
ensures choice of consultant and guaranteed treatment by a consultant rather than a member of 
the hospital doctors’ team, neither of which is guaranteed for public patients.  
Cross-subsidies from public to private 
Take-up of private insurance is therefore skewed along lines of relative social advantage, which 
means that access to health care is differentially available depending on ability to pay. But in 
addition to this, the private system is so intricately bound up with the public system of health care 11 
 
provision in Ireland, that private patients, or rather their insurers, do not pay anything like the full 
economic cost of their care. Those who are privately insured benefit not only from direct fiscal 
incentives, but also from cross-subsidies from the public sector to private medicine. As these are 
not distributed equally across the population, health care funding contributes to inequalities in 
access and quality of provision between public and private patients.  
The cost of tax relief on medical insurance premia and health expenses that was offset against 
income tax is reported by the Revenue Commissioners as €225m. in 2002 and €273m. in 2003 
(Revenue Commissioners 2006, Table IT6). Total current health spending in 2002 was €8.2bn, of 
which rather less than half went to hospitals (Wren 2003). Tax relief on health was scaled back 
over time in line with the objective of broadening the tax base and reducing the use of fiscal 
instruments to achieve policy objectives, and health insurance relief was made available only at 
the standard rate of 20 per cent. But this still would still be a considerable benefit to those with 
private insurance, and a sizeable contribution from the public purse to private health treatment.  
The ownership structure of Irish hospitals is complex, and meshes public and private in complex 
ways that derive from the origins of healthcare in Ireland as a mixture of religious charitable 
institutions on the one hand, and highly targeted, means-tested public care on the other. Some of 
the more recently established hospitals are owned and controlled by the public authorities 
(originally Regional Health Boards, the Health Services Executive since 2005) under the auspices of 
the Department of Health and Children. Others continue to have the status of ‘voluntary’ 
hospitals, owned and controlled by religious orders, though now almost entirely publicly funded. 
All of these hospitals treat both private and public patients. However, hospitals do not charge 
insurance companies the full economic costs of treatment of private patients in public hospitals.  
Nolan and Wiley, looking at areas of direct subsidy such as the difference between the actual 
hotel cost of a private patient and that charged to the insurer, estimated in 2000 that insurance 
payments came to about 50 per cent of total actual costs (B Nolan and Wiley 2000). In 2003, 
charges were raised by a very sizeable 67 per cent to take account of medical inflation, but they 
still paid between half and 60 per cent of total costs (Tussing and Wren 2006, p.139).Furthermore, 
hospitals do not charge fees for use of public hospital equipment and premises when treating 
private patients. We may also note that the public system absorbs cost of professional training, 
public hospital development & indeed, accident and emergency costs. Considerable subsidies can 
be shown to flow from the taxpayer to private hospitals and private patients in public hospitals 
(Commission on Financial Management and Control Systems in the Health Service 2003, p.72). 12 
 
Patients with private insurance can be treated in what are primarily public hospitals because 
consultants’ contracts engage them for a specific number of hours’ commitment to public patients 
per week, on top of which they may engage in private practice (either on-site or off-site, 
depending on type of contract). Since most hospitals not only permit this but rely on the income 
from private patients, this mixed system has flourished. Not more than 20 per cent of bed capacity 
is meant to be occupied by patients admitted from consultants’ ‘private’ waiting lists. But Nolan 
and Wiley showed while there was ‘substantial crossover of private patients to public beds’, the 
flow in the opposite direction was much smaller (B Nolan and Wiley 2000).  In practice it is 
acknowledged that this is very difficult to monitor or maintain the 20 per cent limit to private 
patient admissions, as bed management is mainly managed by consultants themselves rather than 
by hospital managers. Two-thirds of private beds were in public hospitals in 2007, and Dublin 
public hospitals had up to 40  per cent private patients (Burke 2009, pp.16, 118). And about two-
thirds of all admissions to acute inpatient care come via Accident and Emergency rather than 
through scheduled elective surgery. 
The development of a dedicated private for-profit hospital sector added extra capacity to the Irish 
healthcare system, and they accounted for some 12 per cent of acute inpatient beds and elective 
surgery in 2000 (Tussing and Wren 2006, p.98). There were two in 1988, and 18 in 2008 (Burke 
2009, p.216). But a new category of private hospital appeared to be favoured by the Fianna Fáil-
Progressive Democrat coalition during the first decade of the 21
st century, that is, for-profit 
private hospitals, co-located on the grounds of existing public or voluntary hospitals. Eight were 
planned in 2008 (Burke 2009, pp.216-221), though public spending cutbacks postponed the 
implementation of the commitments. This ran counter to the planned rationalization of the 
hospital sector outlined in the Hanly Report. But in addition, there is a considerable hidden cost to 
the Exchequer. Tax reliefs to private hospitals have been estimated to amount to approximately 
40 per cent of the total costs of these facilities, without even considering the value of the land on 
which they are built (Burke 2009, 207; Tussing and Wren 2006, p.106). Only those insured or 
willing to pay-out of pocket have access to private hospital facilities.  
A final aspect of subsidization of the private sector by the public concerns the National Treatment 
Purchase Fund (NTPF).  The Minister for Health and Children initiated the scheme in 2002 to 
alleviate excessive waiting time of public patients for specific procedures. From a starting number 
of fewer than 2,000 patients in 2002, the Fund had treated some 150,000 in total by 2009. 
Undoubtedly the scheme has been of immense benefit to its beneficiaries. But the logic of using 
public money to buy treatment in the private sector raises further issues of both equity and 13 
 
efficiency. The NTPF spent over €40m. on direct patient care in 2004. The Comptroller and Auditor 
General found that some 44 per cent of these procedures were carried out in a public hospital – 
and the majority of these were treated by the same consultant who had referred them from their 
own public patient lists to the NTPF (Office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General 2004, pp. 133-
4). He also noted that there seemed to be little standardization of the costs of procedures at that 
point, though these practices were subsequently addressed (Office of the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General 2004, p.137). In effect the NTPF, while remedying some urgent treatment needs, 
worked by transferring public sector resources into the private sector to treat public sector 
patients.   
In summary, this policy of subsidisation of the private sector through taxpayer money is justified 
by the argument that those who choose to be treated privately forgo their public sector 
entitlement for which they have already paid (through their tax bill). The case may be made that 
they are entitled to better quality treatment and access should they choose to pay more – 
analogous to paying for an upgrade on an airplane perhaps. But we have noted two principal 
counter-arguments. One of these is that that access based on insurance status is inequitable. If 
equitable access is the benchmark, it may be argued that health care is not like plane seats, and 
access ought to be organized on grounds of clinical need rather than ability to pay. The other is 
that the Irish system effects a considerable resource transfer in the form of a variety of subsidies 
from the public to the private sector.  
The evolution of the two-tier system 
The organisation of health care in Ireland, with its distinctive public-private mix, proves to be 
somewhat problematic when it comes to equitable access and indeed efficiency of resource 
allocation and utilization. Why then has this system been maintained, when government policy 
documents reiterated the commitment of every major party to the improvement of the quality of 
public sector health care, major improvements in public primary care and in the public acute care 
system, and a progressive drive to reduce the proportion of private to public hospital beds 
(Department of Health and Children 2001, pp.93-107)?   
The process through which decisions are made can be complex. Breyer and Schneider note, 
In health economics…..there is a large gap between policy recommendations often made 
quite unanimously by academic experts and the measure eventually taken by political 
decision makers (Breyer and Schneider 1992, p.267).  14 
 
Among the most urgent requirements for governments is the need to be re-elected. And 
increasingly competition for power takes place over the allegiances of a growing number of 
weakly aligned or non-aligned voters. It may even be argued that: 
Policymaking is motivated not by the efficiency criteria of welfare theory, but rather by 
the desire to design policy which can obtain a majority in the voting process (Blomquist 
and Christiansen 1999, p.17).  
Private patients benefit from private insurance. In the absence of any clear pathway to a 
significantly better quality of provision in the public sector, it is quite likely that a large proportion 
of the electorate would favour continuing with the existing system of private insurance.  
The particular mix of public and private in Irish public hospitals was made possible because of the 
structure of specialist care provision in hospitals, based on a ‘consultant-led’ service, not 
‘consultant delivered’. The contemporary system is the result of several phases of change and 
attempted change, firstly in the late 1940s, then in the late 1970s, and most recently in 2008. 
Postwar reform initiatives  
The late 1940s saw a surge of reform initiatives in Ireland, parallel to the drive to reform health 
care provision right across Europe in the aftermath of World War Two. Prior to this, two-tier 
health care provision had been the norm, with private care provided by self-employed consultants 
for the wealthier, and a separate system of public care for the less well-off. A change in public 
mood meant that governments sought to establish a integrated schemes for hospital treatment 
and access to primary care, based on clinical need and equally available to all. Ireland was no 
different, and political parties shared broadly similar objectives. Fianna Fáil in 1947 was as 
committed to expanding free primary care as was Noel Browne, with the 1951 Mother and Child 
Bill. This would have provided free acute and primary medical care for expectant mothers and for 
all children up to age 16, through bringing self-employed doctors onto the public payroll.  
Quite a variety of schemes were eventually introduced across Europe. Doctors do not necessarily 
hold a trump card in negotiations with government. In a study of the health reform initiatives in 
Sweden, Switzerland, and France, Ellen Immergut argued that institutional ‘veto points’ mattered 
more than pressure group power in shaping outcomes. Swedish consultants were unable to 
prevail against a strong and unified majority government decision.  In Switzerland, in contrast, the 
outcome was the most favourable to private medicine, and government was confined to providing 
subsidies for private insurance. A united medical profession was able to use referendums in local 
regions to fragment public opinion and weaken government’s ability to act (Immergut 1992, p.58).  15 
 
The conflict over health reforms in Ireland in 1951, widely understood at the time as a stand-off 
between church and state, has been reinterpreted as primarily a conflict between private 
medicine and health policy reformers. Doctors were able to mobilize a powerful player – Catholic 
bishops, and specifically John Charles McQuaid of Dublin – on their behalf (Barrington 1987). 
These had ready access to the ear of government; and a weak and divided coalition was especially 
poorly equipped to hold a firm line against the expressly articulated preferences of the Catholic 
hierarchy (Inglis 1998; McCullagh 1998). 
The net effect of governments’ failure to introduce their preferred measures was a greatly 
reduced government appetite for reform, and the introduction, as in Switzerland, of public 
subsidies to private insurance, in the form of the 1957 Voluntary Health Insurance Act. This was 
aimed at the 15  per cent of the population outside the means-tested hospital access introduced 
in 1953 (Barrington 2003, p.106). Public funding replaced the charitable or sweepstake-based 
funding of the ‘voluntary’ hospitals. Yet these hospitals were not nationalized as their British 
counterparts had been.  
The 1979 changes 
 As the ‘public’ hospitals were upgraded, the need to rationalize conditions of work across the 
sectors grew more urgent. This resulted in the introduction by a Fianna Fáil government of the 
1979 ‘common contract’ in which the combination of public and private was entrenched. This was 
an attempt to create some commonality in conditions of work for specialists who had previously 
worked under widely varying conditions. A two-tier career structure then obtained, in which some 
consultants were full-time salaried employees of the regional health boards, and others received 
no salary or pension from the state, but worked in the ‘voluntary’ hospital sector, earning fees 
from private patients, and gaining some recompense for treating non-fee-paying patients from the 
hospitals from the grants they received from the Department of Health (Barrington 1987, p. 107). 
But neither clinical accountability of consultants nor any coherent system for monitoring their 
work-time was adequately built into the consultant contract. 
Between 1979 and 2008, consultants’ contracts required them to offer 33 hours a week to the 
public sector, between running clinics, undertaking procedures, and ensuring administrative 
efficiency of their caseloads, but it did not specify the extent of their personal time commitment 
to public patients. In practice, public patients were likely to be attended to by non-consultant 
hospital doctors whose salaries are also paid by from public health sector finances. This facilitated 
many specialists to concentrate on their private patients. Until 1997, it was possible for 16 
 
consultants to have one of two types of contract: one which paid a salary but with some 
‘abatement’ of the rate payable, and which permitted them to engage in private practice in 
addition to public employment; and another which permitted only work in the public sector on a 
salaried basis, and which paid a somewhat higher standard salary in recognition of private 
earnings forgone. The latter option – only held by 47 consultants in 2003 – was abolished in 1997 
on the recommendation of a Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the public sector 
(Commission on Financial Management and Control Systems in the Health Service 2003, p.66). 
This further liberalized the consultant’s contract and expanded the scope of the public-private 
mix, while simultaneously providing some saving in public salary expenses. About three-fifths of 
consultants in 2008 had ‘Category 1’ contracts that permitted them to treat private patients 
within the public hospital in which they were employed. Just over one-third of the consultants, 
mostly in Dublin and Cork, had ‘Category 2’ contracts that permitted them to treat patients 
privately off-site as well as within their main place of work. The method of reimbursement thus 
entrenched is known to have significant effects on the behaviour of medical professionals 
(Propper, Croxson and Shearer 2002). Consultants are salaried employees for their public sector 
work. But they are paid on a fee per patient basis by their private patients. There is an opportunity 
cost to consultants of working in the public sector – that is, reimbursement in the private sector 
(Rickman and McGuire 1999, 54)  As two experts in this area have noted:  
Public health systems have done little to alter the underlying incentives whereby those 
with the greatest control over the conditions of supply are rewarded rather than 
penalised for maintaining waiting lists. (Street and Duckett 1996).  
The public-private mix itself may therefore be seen to contribute directly to excessive waiting in 
Ireland (Tussing and Wren 2006, p.115). 
Yet the anomalies of Ireland’s ‘mixed’ rather than ‘hybrid’ system grew over the decades that 
followed. The Brennan Report concluded bluntly that ‘the opportunity to earn additional monies 
through private practice, combined with the ability to delegate public work to other staff, is not in 
the best interests of the Irish taxpayer’ (Commission on Financial Management and Control 
Systems in the Health Service 2003, p.66). This report argued that the only solution to the 
perverse incentives built into the system, from the point of view of a high-quality public health 
service, would be the complete separation of public and private practice: 
The existing arrangements for mixing public and private treatments are inherently 
unsatisfactory from a management and control perspective. They result in a conflict of 
interest for Consultants between meeting clinical obligations to public patients on the one 17 
 
hand and, on the other, the prioritisation, treatment and the use of publicly provided 
infrastructure and resources in public hospitals for private patients. They also raise issues 
of fair competition with private hospitals in that the resources used are not charged for 
fully. They severely limit the time the majority of clinicians have to pursue resource 
management. Ultimately, these issues can only be resolved fully by completely separating 
public and private practices. (Commission on Financial Management and Control Systems 
in the Health Service 2003, p.71). 
Consultant contracts in the 2000s 
It is generally acknowledged that there is a significant shortfall in the number of consultants 
relative to population size, compared with other developed countries. In Ireland in 2005, non-
consultant hospital doctors (NCHD) outnumbered consultants by about 2.3 to 1 (just under 2,000 
consultants, and a little over 4,000 NCHD), and hospital service depends on these doctors working 
long hours in overtime (Tussing and Wren 2006, p.23). Government policy adopted the 
recommendations of the various consultancy reports that the health service be consultant-
delivered, not consultant-led. A new consultant contract was finally negotiated in 2008 as a 
precondition to hiring more consultants. This involved a commitment to work for 37 hours in the 
public system, in return for a significant increase in the remuneration package – making Irish 
consultants the best-paid in Europe by a considerable margin. The  Brennan Report recommended 
that ‘all new Consultant appointments, covering new posts and the replacement of existing 
Consultants, should be on the basis of contracting the Consultants to work exclusively in the public 
sector’ (Commission on Financial Management and Control Systems in the Health Service 2003, 
p.67). But only about a quarter of consultants had signed up for the public-only option on offer 
this time. The rest remained free to develop their private practice. The new consultant contract 
‘reinforces rather than deconstructs the two-tier system of hospital care’, resulting in a system in 
which  Sara Burke has argued that ‘apartheid in Irish healthcare was official government health 
policy’ (Burke 2009, pp.117, 33).  
Consultants sought to protect both existing members’ rights and the rights of new appointees to 
continue to practice privately.   
The capacity of the public sector to deliver adequate services remained well below the level of 
actual demand in the system. And the health sector had long been characterized by fragmented 
management in unclear lines of accountability, such that overall system coordination presented 
major challenges. Capacity constraints can be identified across a range of measures. Bed 18 
 
availability and extraordinarily  high rates of bed occupancy are highly visible indicators  that 
inflame popular feeling, especially when people see severely ill patients lying on trollies waiting for 
diagnosis, admission, and treatment (Tussing and Wren 2006, pp.182-90). Bed occupancy was 
regularly at or in excess of 100 per cent of capacity, compared with international norms closer to 
85 per cent (Burke 2009, p.106). 
The abolition of the regional health boards and the creation of the Health Services Executive (HSE) 
in 2005 represented a decisive move in the direction of centralization, with a view to achieving 
greater coordinating capacity and therefore greater efficiency. However, problems of managing 
the new structures generated significant new problems. Most significantly, the relationship 
between the Department of Health and Children on the one hand, and the Health Services 
Executive on the other, had not been fully specified at the time the legislation was enacted, and 
produced real uncertainty over domains of responsibility, initiative, and financial accountability 
(Tussing and Wren 2006, pp. 305-320). Spending control in a very large and diverse system was a 
real challenge. But opportunities to deliberate on resource allocation had been progressively 
reduced over time (Barrington 2003, p.116). Accountability within hospitals remained severely 
under-defined. Indeed, weak financial controls within hospitals were specifically identified as a 
problem in the Brennan  Report, which recommended that ‘where they do not already exist, chief 
executive officers in all hospitals should immediately establish an Executive Management 
Committee’, to agree the hospital Service Plan, monitor performance against budget, agree 
corrective measures, and advise on policy matters (Commission on Financial Management and 
Control Systems in the Health Service 2003, p.68).  
Organizational reform of the Irish health system was thus pushed toward centralization of 
decision-making, though with a crucial lacuna in accountability and decision-making at the centre. 
This went against the trend in many other European societies, which had begun to experiment 
with decentralization, creation of internal markets, and fostering of competitive opportunities to 
try to achieve cost savings and efficiencies. Michael Moran has argued that this is not inconsistent 
with continuing government oversight and management: 
Closely integrated oligarchies dominated by professional and corporate interests, 
operating with a substantial degree of independence from the core institutions of the 
state, are being replaced: by looser, more open, more unstable networks; by networks in 
which professional and corporate elites still exercise great power but in a more contested 
environment than hitherto; and by an institutional setting in which the core institutions of 
the state exercise much tighter surveillance and control than hitherto. This is the sense in 19 
 
which to speak about the rise of the market and the retreat of the state is a great 
oversimplification. (Moran 1999, p.178). 
A broad political and policy consensus appeared to exist in Ireland that market-based solutions in 
a small market would not be beneficial (Wiley 2000, p.922). Perhaps the real issue, though, is the 
weak political capacity displayed to date to manage organizational change effectively. 
But the problem at the core of the system – the intermingling of public and private – was not 
centrally addressed by any of these structural changes. The consultant contract goes hand in hand 
with entrenched differentiated entitlements of those with and without private insurance. Nominal 
commitment to the public sector notwithstanding, successive governments presided over the 
expansion of a two-tier health care system.  
Conclusion 
Irish health care policy in the early 21
st century was approaching a decisive point. Electoral 
pressures to reform and improve the many deficiencies in health services were strong. The quality 
of provision in the public sector needed to be improved significantly. All governments pledged 
themselves to do this – to reduce waiting lists, reduce trolley-based waiting time for admission, 
make hospitals cleaner and safer places, and introduce the sort of evidence-based practice 
assessment that improved patient outcomes but that could only be delivered in a modernized 
health delivery system.  
Key to doing all this was the employment of a great many more front-line medical personnel, 
which would involve increasing the role of consultants and redesigning the role of non-consultant 
hospital doctors. But the great majority of consultants already had private practice commitments. 
Much of the delivery of services took place through private practice structures, whether in public 
or private hospitals. A slight majority of the population was equipped with private insurance 
cover.  
Under these conditions, successive governments seemed unable to decide where their priorities 
for health care reform lay. And while they spoke of their commitment to public sector quality, in 
effect private sector incentives were, if anything, strengthened. Ireland was no longer in the early 
or foundational stages of constructing a national integrated health service, as so many European 
countries were in the years following the end of World War Two. At that point, decisive policy 
changes were perhaps more easily undertaken. But reform of a developed health care system can 
be likened to rebuilding the ship while already at sea. A variety of problems in health sector 20 
 
governance have remained unresolved. At the heart of it lies the conundrum of the intermeshing 
of public and private. Some commentators, as we have noted, recommend a complete separation 
of the two. Quite how to do this, in a system that relies so heavily on the private sector to deliver 
central parts of its services, is unclear. How it might be initiated, and by whom, given the complex 
relationships within the Health Services Executive, and between the HSE and the Department of 
Health and Children, remained a puzzle.  
Irish politicians claimed to wish to strengthen public sector provision, yet acted to strengthen 
private sector rewards and incentives. But if governments fail to take decisive action for long 
enough, inaction or indecision itself becomes a policy when it is pursed overtime in a fairly 
consistent way (Korpi and Palme 1998). The public-private mix in Irish health care is a good 
example of policy evolution along unplanned lines, following contradictory imperatives, where 
non-decisions eventually become de facto decisions. 21 
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